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TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD IN ACTION
Patrick Daly 
Lonergan Institute at Boston College 
I think there is something very true in the Hegelian connection between the subjective spirit and 
its manifestation in objective spirit…Self-appropriation is conditioned not merely by the fact that 
one is empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious; it is conditioned also by that fact as 
manifested. 
Understanding and Being, CWL 5, 219 
All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind 
of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions that we are happy or 
the reverse. 
Aristotle, Poetics 1450a 17-20 
The fact is I think I am a verb rather than a pronoun. A verb is anything that signifies to be; to 
do; or to suffer. I signify all three. 
Ulysses Grant, handwritten note while dying with throat cancer 
1. INTRODUCTION
Lonergan’s treatment of transcendental method in the first chapter of Method in Theology 
presents a bit of a puzzle.1  While his instruction to apply the “operations as intentional to the 
operations as conscious” [M 14] makes sense with reference to the transcendental operations of 
understanding, judging, and deciding in coming to self-knowledge, it does not make sense with 
reference to “experiencing one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding” [M 15] as 
a moment of self-consciousness – or what he calls here “just consciousness” [M 15] – upon 
which the other operations build.  Something about heightening consciousness at the level of 
experience is different from the reflexive operations by which we objectify this heightened 
experience [M 8-9].  Lonergan’s summary statement of transcendental method makes no explicit 
reference to what this difference is.  In what follows, I work out an interpretation of 
transcendental method in terms of Lonergan’s earlier treatment of consciousness as experience 
1 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). Cited hereafter in text as [M page 
number]. 
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and self-presence – to which he makes passing reference in the first chapter of Method – with 
explicit attention to the difficulties of his summary statement.  In doing so, I relate the problem 
of being explicit about heightening consciousness at the level of experience to the problem of 
objectifying the subject-as-subject: both are a matter of performance.  In this regard I identify a 
performative mode of subjective operation – in addition to the direct and introspective modes 
that Lonergan identifies in Insight2 - and develop an account of this mode of operation as it is 
manifested experientially in feelings and existentially in action.  I relate the notion of feelings 
as data of consciousness to Lonergan’s account of the unity-in-tension of human consciousness, 
various forms and degrees of tension being the primary feeling-states of conscious experience. 
Finally, I note the significance of transcendental method in action with regard to understanding 
the subtleties of subject-to-subject communication in the encounter of patient and clinician as 
part of a philosophy of health from the standpoint of generalized empirical method on which I 
am working. 
2. THE PUZZLE OF TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD
Noting the problem 
Lonergan speaks of four levels of conscious intentionality: empirical, intellectual, rational, and 
responsible [M 9].  For brevity’s sake, he denotes the various operations on the four levels by the 
principal occurrence on each level [M 14], which can be represented: 
EUJD = experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. 
He indicates that transcendental method is a “fourfold matter” of “heightening one’s 
consciousness” by applying the “operations as intentional to the operations as conscious” [M 14]. 
2 Bernard Lonergan, Insight, vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. 
Crowe (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1992), 299. 
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This is problematic since heightening consciousness at the first transcendental level does not 
involve applying experience as intentional to EUJD as conscious.  If anything, it involves 
applying experience as conscious to EUJD as intentional; but this formulation won’t do either, 
since consciousness is not an operation.  The difficulty that emerges – as Lonergan is all too well 
aware3 – is how to make explicit the distinction between consciously heightening one’s 
conscious operations and intentionally heightening one’s conscious operations without truncating 
the subject who does so.  Lonergan handles this problem obliquely in this chapter and more 
thoroughly and effectively elsewhere in his work, as I discuss below, but the ambiguity of his 
compressed statement of transcendental method is a clue to dimensions of the problem that are 
worth further investigation, in my estimation. 
Transcendental method unfolds as a complex series of operations, which for ease of reference 
I notate opposite Lonergan’s text as follows: 
Text [M 14-15] Shorthand 
 
[I]f for brevity’s sake we denote the various operations on the 
four levels by the principal occurrence on that level, we may speak of 
the operations as experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. 
These operations are both conscious and intentional. 
 
 
EUJD 
But what is conscious, can be intended. To apply the operations as 
intentional to the operations as conscious is a fourfold matter of (1) 
experiencing one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, 
 
E(EUJD) 
(2) understanding the unity and relations of one’s experienced 
experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, U[E(EUJD)] 
(3) affirming the reality of one’s experienced and understood 
experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding J(U[E(EUJD)]) 
and (4) deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the 
spontaneous relatedness of one’s experienced, understood, affirmed 
experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding. 
D[J(U[E(EUJD)])] 
 
3 “The recurrent difficulty in cognitional theory and psychology generally arises from a failure to distinguish 
between our actual performance and our abbreviated objectification of that performance.” Bernard Lonergan, “The 
Origins of Christian Realism,” in A Second Collection, ed. W. Ryan and B. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1974), 243. 
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Concerning the basic pattern of operations, Lonergan says, “whenever these operations are 
performed, the subject is aware of himself operating, present to himself operating, experiencing 
himself operating” [M 8].  This series of descriptions highlights several key formulations of 
consciousness from earlier work.  The phrase, “aware of himself operating,” is drawn from 
Insight, where Lonergan says that consciousness is “awareness immanent in cognitional acts” 
and not an “inward look.”4 The phrase, “present to himself operating,” is drawn from 
“Cognitional Structure” (among other sources) where Lonergan treats cognitional operations as 
conscious in terms of subjective self-presence.5  The phrase “experiencing himself operating” is 
drawn from The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ where Lonergan speaks at 
length about human consciousness as experience.6  Beginning with this last formulation, 
Lonergan distinguishes interior and exterior experience within the field of experience, while 
“experience in itself forms a sort of continuous and rather confused whole” [OPCC, 6].  This is a 
key notion with respect to the unity of consciousness, which I address below in relation to 
Lonergan’s treatment of consciousness in Insight.  Staying with the distinction for the moment, 
what we experience exteriorly as an object (per modum obiecti) is apprehended by a special act 
of sensation [159]; what we experience interiorly on the side of the subject (ex parte subiecti) is 
our “becom[ing] aware of…the one seeing and the act of seeing…the one who understands and 
the act of understanding…the one who judges and the act of judging” [159-60].  Lonergan refers 
to these two aspects of experience several pages apart in Method without characterizing them as 
interior or exterior: (1) the “principal” operation at the first of the four levels of conscious 
 
 
4 Insight, 344. 
5 Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," in Collection, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. 
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 209-210. 
6 Bernard Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ [De constutione Christi ontologica et 
psychologica], vol. 7 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shield (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2002), 157-169. Cited hereafter in text as [OPCC, page #].
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intentionality [M 14] and (2) the experiencing oneself operating that is not “another operation,” 
but an instance of “being conscious” [M 8]. 
We can modify the shorthand notation indicated above by using different fonts to distinguish 
these two aspects of experience: (1) E for the “principle” operation or exterior experience and (2) 
E for “experiencing oneself operating” or interior experience.  Thus, we can rewrite the first 
level of transcendental method as E(EUJD), which is equivalent to the sum of its component 
operations: EE + EU + EJ + ED.7  This notation allows us to focus on a discrete problem at the 
first transcendental level – namely, what is EE?  Some may balk at putting the question this way 
since it suggests that E is a separate operation from E and thus reduces the conscious subject to 
object of consciousness.  I concede the problem.8 But what are we to make of Lonergan’s very 
words, “experiencing one’s experiencing” [M 14], repeated several times with minor variation in 
the summary statement of transcendental method?  Did he misspeak or was he tacitly engaged in 
virtue of the tension of human consciousness with a unity at once precarious and alive? I am 
pursuing the latter possibility. The most important point to keep in mind is that the field of 
experience – encompassing interior and exterior experience – is unified performatively. The 
second point is that as embodied subjects’ wakefulness and attentiveness vary; consciousness is a 
matter of degree. 
Regarding EE, or experiencing one’s experience, Lonergan employs several images to 
 
 
7 I represent all four levels of transcendental method utilizing this format in the Appendix at Table 1. 
8 See Bernard Lonergan, “Christ as Subject: A Reply,” in Collection, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 164: “John 
knows his dog. John knows himself. In both, the subject is John. In the first, the object is John’s dog.  In the 
second, the object is John himself. It follows that knowing is of two kinds: there is direct knowing in which the 
object is not the subject; and there is reflexive knowing in which the object is the subject. Name reflexive knowing 
consciousness. Define the subject as the object of consciousness.” Left only with these alternatives, the subject-as- 
subject remains in shadows and never comes to light. 
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convey his meaning.  In the paragraph after his summary statement of transcendental method, he 
says that we must “enlarge our interest” to encompass the intending subject at the “periphery” of 
our attending to a focal object [M 15]. In “The Fragility of Consciousness,” Fred Lawrence 
distinguishes focal and tacit awareness in relation to both interior and exterior experience 
(restricting the spatial metaphor of “periphery” to sense perception): “internal experience is that 
tacit, implicit, or background presence of ourselves to ourselves concomitant with any conscious 
acts which is the radical meaning of ‘consciousness’ and ‘conscious’”; similarly, “external 
experience as sensation (as opposed to perception)…can be utterly tacit or background for our 
focal awareness, such as, e.g., peripheral vision.”9  Just as we can enlarge our experience 
interiorly, we can also do so exteriorly, as when we pay closer attention to what is going on. 
This relates to Lonergan’s designation of experience as the “principal occurrence” [M 14] on the 
first level, although it is not listed among the first five operations – seeing, hearing, touching, 
smelling, tasting – of the eighteen that make up the “basic pattern” [M 6].  Think of the difficulty 
that a remarkably gifted investigator like Barbara McClintock had conveying the experience – 
interior and exterior – at the heart of her scientific investigations.10 
A second image is that of fullness.  Earlier in the chapter Lonergan says, “On all four levels 
[of conscious intentionality], we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is 
a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different” [M 9].  In this case, the 
image of fullness relates to development; that is, the blossoming of the subject in a 
differentieated set of operations.  Although Lonergan does not say this, we might also think of 
fullness in terms of growth in the luminosity of the subject at each and every level of operation.  
Thus in performing the first step of transcendental method – E(EUJD) – one is more  
 
9 Fred Lawrence, "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other," 
Theological Studies (1993) 54: 70-71, nn. 21 & 22. 
10 See Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (New York: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1983).
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luminously oneself in experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.   And in 
persorming the other steps of transcendental method, one grows in the lumionosity of 
self-knowledge.11 
A third image is that of perfection. In OPCC, Lonergan defines consciousness as “interior 
experience of oneself and one’s acts” [157], where experience is a “preliminary unstructured sort 
of awareness” [159].  He adds, “[I]t is a serious error to think that consciousness consists not in 
that preliminary unstructured awareness that we have spoken of, but rather in the subsequent 
focusing and concentrating of attention” [167].  This latter statement would seem to preclude 
Lonergan’s saying that E(EUJD) is “just consciousness,” and yet he does.  One way around this 
difficulty is to understand E(EUJD) not in terms of focusing but rather enlargement – or in 
meditative terms, relaxation – of consciousness.  Another way concerns the notion of ontological 
perfection, about which Lonergan says: “‘Conscious’ adds nothing to being; it simply denotes 
being of a certain degree of ontological perfection” [189].  Nobody’s perfect, as Thomas 
Aquinas and Billy Wilder had occasion to say, and not being uniformly and perfectly conscious 
is among the many aspects of human living to which that dictum applies.  With this in mind, it is 
possible to understand EE as a perfecting of conscious experience (E), such perfecting being a 
matter of degree. 
While going from E to EE is not much of a “stretch,” it is, to be sure, a less than felicitous 
rendering of perfection.  More importantly, neither the spatial imagery of center/periphery or 
exterior/interior, nor the duplication of the word experience sufficiently distinguish what occurs 
at the first level of transcendental method from what occurs at the next three levels or in the basic 
 
11 See Bernard Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento," in Collection, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 223: 
"Substance prescinds from the difference between the opaque being that is merely substance and the luminous being 
that is conscious. Subject denotes the luminous being.” 
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pattern of operations.  I now turn to a way to meet this difficulty that builds on Lonergan’s 
treatment of modes of subjective presence in “Cognitional Structure” and modes of cognitive 
operation in Insight. 
Noting a solution 
 
In “Consciousness and Self-Knowledge” – the third section of “Cognitional Structure” – 
Lonergan presents an early version of transcendental method in terms of a reduplication of EUJ, 
the structured operations of knowing.  Consciousness entails “experiencing experience, 
understanding, and judging”; self-knowledge entails the “reduplicated structure [of] experience, 
understanding, and judging with respect to experience, understanding, and judging.”12 Since 
“consciousness is of the acting subject qua acting…experiencing of one’s sensitivity is identical 
with one’s sensitivity coming to act.”13 Concerning the distinction between internal and external 
experience, Lonergan asks, “[W]hat is the original datum that has been expressed by a spatial 
metaphor?” and goes on to describe the now familiar three modes of subjective presence: 
subject-to-object, subject-as-object, subject-as-subject.14  Introspection concerns the subject-as- 
object.  The heightening of “one’s presence to oneself,” such as occurs in the transition from 
dreamless sleep to dreaming and from dreaming to being fully awake, concerns the subject-as- 
subject.15 Working with these three modes of subjective presence allows us to be explicit in 
stating what is different about the first level of transcendental operation: it concerns the subject- 
 
 
 
 
 
12 “Cognitional Structure,” 208. 
13 “Cognitional Structure,” 209. Although Lonergan writes “experience of,” its identity with coming to act concerns 
the mode of subject-as-subject and not subject-as-object. 
14 “Cognitional Structure,” 209-10. 
15 See “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 223: “From the viewpoint of substance, those differences are merely 
accidental. But they are not accidental to the subject, for the subject is not an abstraction; he is a concrete reality, all 
of him, a being in the luminousness of being.” 
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as-subject qua acting. It is a performative mode that sets the prior conditions for higher modes 
of transcendental operation.16 
In Insight, Lonergan distinguishes two modes of cognitional operation: a direct mode that 
begins from data of sense,17 and an introspective mode that begins from data of consciousness.18 
These modes of cognitional operation correspond to two of the modes of subjective presence: 
subject-to-object and subject-as-object.  To these we should add a third performative mode of 
operation – an existential as opposed to a strictly cognitive mode – that constitutes a heightening 
of “one’s presence to oneself” as acting subject.  The first level of transcendental method brings 
this performative mode of operation to light as both precarious and potentially significant. These 
three modes of operation can be symbolized as follows: 
1. SóO, the subject-object dipole of conscious intentional operation in the direct or 
subject-to-object mode,19 
2. Só(SóO), reflexive operation in the introspective or subject-as-object mode, 
 
3. S2óO, heightened self-consciousness in the performative or subject-as-subject mode of 
operation. 
I compare the original shorthand notation of transcendental method with a modified version 
based on this differentiated symbolism in the Appendix at Tables 2 & 3.  Several points 
regarding the modified notation are in order here. First, I explicitly indicate that the first level of 
 
16 “Now it is true, of course, that self-appropriation occurs through a heightening of consciousness and such a 
heightening reveals not the subject as object, but the subject as subject. I should contend, however, that this 
heightening of consciousness proceeds to an objectification of the subject, to an intelligent and reasonable 
affirmation of the subject, and so to a transition from the subject as subject to the subject as object” [M 262]. 
17 These include “colors, shapes, sounds, odors, tastes, the hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, wet and 
dry, and so forth” (Insight, 299). 
18 These include “of acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, 
understanding, formulating, reflecting, judging, and so forth” (Insight, 299). 
19 For the image of subject-object dipole, see “Metaphysics as Horizon” in Collection, vol. 4 of Collected Works of 
Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 198- 
204. 
10 
 
transcendental operation is performative, not introspective, which is consistent with Lonergan’s 
position that “one must begin from the performance, if one is to have the experience necessary 
for understanding what the performance is.”20 Second, I indicate that higher levels of 
transcendental operation can be performative as well as introspective, since we can heighten 
awareness of ourselves in operation at all levels.  The subject-as-subject operating at any given 
level is not bound by the horizon of that level, not even when operating in the introspective mode 
of consciousness.  Rather, the subject increases in dimensionality as well as power, such that the 
higher-level subject sublates lower level operations.21 Proceeding methodically in the 
performative mode of consciousness, we set conditions to become aware of ourselves as 
operators growing in unified intensity. The transcendental interplay of performative and 
introspective modes of operation is analogous to a musician who learns to play a piece of music 
by breaking it down into parts and then pulls it all together in actual performance.  Or a teacher 
who breaks new material down into component parts for students to learn and at the same time 
demonstrates mastery of the topic as a whole in dynamic response to their actual learning. 
Third, this account brings forward the question whether consciousness in the mode of subject-as- 
subject can be objectified in any meaningful way.  Fred Crowe, in his essay “The Puzzle of the 
Subject-as-Subject in Lonergan,” argues that we get at the reality of the subject-as-subject by 
means of symbols: “Symbols are the means; understanding by proxy is the result.”22  Obviously, 
in order to talk about this problem one engages in verbal symbols. Obviously, I have just 
 
20 “Christ the Subject,” 174. Lonergan relates this position to Augustine’s awareness that self-presence precedes 
self-inquiry and Aquinas’ reference to Augustine on this point in distinguishing self-presence and the even more 
difficult attainment of self-knowledge (ibid, 162 n.11). In terms of contemporary discourse, Fred Lawrence relates 
Lonergan’s position to the importance that Jürgen Habermas places on beginning from “a performative attitude” 
(“Fragility of Consciousness,” 71). 
21 Sublation refers to the relation between a higher level of conscious operation and lower levels, which it “goes 
beyond…directs…preserves…and brings…to a far fuller fruition” [M 316]. 
22 Frederick E. Crowe, "The Puzzle of the Subject as Subject in Lonergan," in Lonergan on the Level of our Time, 
ed. Michael Vertin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 171. 
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resorted to a formalized symbolism in order to elucidate transcendental method. But Lonergan is 
clear that the rock upon which transcendental method stands is not a set of symbols, but rather 
the “unobjectified” acting subject [M 20].23 
There is a passage – which Crowe quotes at even greater length than I do here24 – that can 
support another approach to this problem, in which Lonergan asks: 
What is the reality of this subject as subject? It is reality in a very prior and probably 
conceptually incomplete sense, but nonetheless in a very real sense. The subject as 
subject is reality in the sense that we live and die, love and hate, rejoice and suffer, desire 
and fear, wonder and dread, inquire and doubt…the subject that is the victim of all these 
things and the origin of all these things…that subject in his own living…is reality in that 
ontic sense, prior to any ontology, prior to any conception of [self].25 
While Lonergan emphasizes the significance of this existential level consistently and often 
enough to make clear his abiding awareness of its ontic priority, a certain intellectualism haunts 
his work that tends to block open communication between existential and intentional modes of 
operation.26 With respect to transcendental method, this is manifest in his ambiguous 
formulation of the first level as “just conscious.” For all that, I think that Lonergan’s account 
can be developed to handle the relationship between existential performance and cognitive 
development more “luminously.” I argue in the next section that the reality of the subject-as- 
subject is manifested experientially in feelings (corresponding to the image of “victim” above) 
 
23 “[T]he meaning of an experiential pattern is elemental. It is the conscious performing of a transformed subject in 
his transformed world” [M 63]. 
24 “The Puzzle of the Subject as Subject,” 164. 
25 Bernard Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and 
Existentialism, vol. 18 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), 315-16. 
26 For example, regarding Lonergan’s and Voegelin’s different viewpoints concerning objective truth and the 
“luminosity” of the existential subject, see Eugene Webb, Philosophers of Consciousness (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1988), 95-102. 
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and outwardly in action (corresponding to the image of “origin”). Further, I argue that the unity-
in-tension of human subjectivity is both a source and a resultant of the self-correcting cycle of 
experience-inquiry-action-new experience, within which differentiated schemes of conscious 
intentionality develop and deepen the historical subject who suffers and acts in relation to truth 
and goodness. 
 
 
3. MANIFESTING THE SUBJECT-AS-SUBJECT 
 
Feelings as felt 
 
A symbolism that differentiates direct, introspective, and performative modes of conscious 
operation has a role to play in self-understanding, but what is the empirical basis on which any 
such symbolism is based? Clearly, the subject-as-subject is manifest in acts of experiencing, 
understanding, judging, and deciding. But are there data given in consciousness that manifest 
the subject-as-subject as distinct from the subject’s acts? In OPCC, Lonergan observes, 
We are more conscious of ourselves than of our acts, since it is much easier for us to 
attain the one who sees and hears and touches and feels and wonders and inquires and 
understands and defines and reflects and examines evidence and judges and desires and 
wills, and so forth and so on, than to distinguish all these acts from one another [167]. 
We experience ourselves in act as both integrator and operator in what I am calling the 
performative mode.27 As Lonergan is careful to add, “[W]e are not conscious of ourselves 
except by way of our acts” [167].  This is why it is appropriate to speak of modes of 
consciousness, since all modes relate to the same unified subject performing any given act: we 
experience ourselves performing any given set of acts at the same time that we experience more 
 
27 With the understanding that experience, like insight, unfolds as pati and actus perfecti. See Bernard Lonergan, 
Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and 
Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 116-121. 
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than ourselves in virtue of the transitive nature of these acts [M 7]. Data given in the 
performative mode pertain to ourselves qua acting – that is, to the subject-as-subject – and thus 
are data of consciousness. Since they are not the same data as acts given in consciousness, they 
are also irreducible to what we objectify in the introspective mode of subject-as-object. What are 
they? In my opinion, data of consciousness in the performative mode are the feelings that are 
accessible as experienced at all levels of intentional consciousness. 
That feelings are data of consciousness is a judgment of fact that is readily verifiable in the 
experience of any conscious individual. Difficulties arise, however, in relating this judgment to 
Lonergan’s own accounts of cognitional and existential operation, including transcendental 
method. I address these difficulties under two headings: (1) several texts expressly related to 
feeling; and (2) the relationship between his accounts of existential/deliberative operation 
(including the self-correcting cycle of learning) and cognitive operation. My limited purpose in 
this section is to situate my claim that feelings are data of consciousness in the mode of subject- 
as-subject as making explicit what is implicit in Lonergan’s account of transcendental method. 
To begin then with the passage from Phenomenology and Logic quoted above, Lonergan 
characterizes the reality of the subject-as-subject as a series of verbs, all of which involve feeling 
– “love and hate, rejoice and suffer, desire and fear, wonder and dread” – and goes on to 
characterize the subject-as-subject in terms of experiencing such feelings as “the terror of death, 
the agony of suffering, and the torture of guilt” [315]. Regarding the aesthetic pattern of 
experience, he says in Insight, “Conscious living is itself a joy that reveals its spontaneous 
authenticity…in the exhilaration of sun-lit morning air, in the sweep of a broad perspective, in 
the swing of a melody” [207]. In Method he says, “Feelings are related to objects, to one 
another, and to their subject…[as] related to their subject: they are the mass and momentum and 
14 
 
the power of his conscious living” [64].28 In characterizing the reality of Christ’s human 
consciousness in reference to Christ’s experience of pain [OPCC, 213], Lonergan refers to pain 
as felt, not simply pain as imagined or represented symbolically.29 In this regard, Lonergan 
relates “feelings as felt” to an infrastructure of “pure experience,” as contrasted with “feelings as 
integrated in conscious living.”30 Similarly, Lonergan speaks of “being in love” as “the prior 
conscious reality that words and, more securely, deeds reveal,”31 about which Fred Lawrence 
comments: 
[F]eeling, the “prior conscious reality” about which Lonergan is speaking here, is pure 
experience in the sense that as an internal experience it is a mode of consciousness as 
distinct from self-knowledge. In other words consciousness itself is prior to and distinct 
from any later process in which we heighten our awareness through inquiring about and 
understanding, through checking out and judging what we undergo in experiencing 
feelings.32 
These texts indicate that Lonergan did at times treat feelings as data of consciousness and 
relate them explicitly to the mode of subject-as-subject. However,  because he integrated 
feelings most explicitly into his theoretical account of conscious intentionality at the level of 
value [M 30-41] and not at the level of experience, a series of problems has followed in the wake 
of his account. I should again emphasize that I am approaching this contested area of Lonergan 
studies from the standpoint of understanding the relation between existential and intentional 
modes of operation, particularly in reference to transcendental method. With this in mind, if 
 
 
28 Lonergan uses the same phrase to characterize feelings at [M 30]. 
29 “Christ as Subject,” 170: “Pains are not objects of sense, sensibilia propria. There are no unconscious pains. The 
subject of pain feels the pain.” 
30 Bernard Lonergan, A Third Collection (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 58. 
31 "Existenz and Aggiornamento," 229. 
32 “The Fragility of Consciousness,” 70. 
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feelings originate as data of consciousness at the level of experience, and those very data develop 
meaningfully at higher levels of operation, we can account for the apprehension of value in 
feelings [M 37] with much less difficulty than if feelings arise de novo at the level of 
deliberation.  We can also account for the relationship between feelings as “states and trends” 
and feelings as “intentional responses” [M 30] without falling back into faculty psychology. 
Because one not only experiences “feelings as felt,” but also experiences one’s own operations 
of understanding, judging and deciding,33 so one’s feelings occur at different levels and include 
such things as the first stirrings of wonder and inquiry and the release of tension that 
accompanies insight; the exigence of judgment and the weight of evidence ; the ease or distress 
of conscience in making good or bad decisions.34 Take, for example, Christ’s experiencing pain. 
This did not pop into consciousness at an upper level of consciousness. If he did not first 
experience pain, there would be no exigence on his part to understand and affirm the significance 
of this experience as suffering; and without understanding the reality of this pain and suffering, 
there would be no exigence on his part to value and accept this pain and suffering as 
redemptive.35 
 
 
 
33 “We are conscious of ourselves in all our activities. But that consciousness is merely on the level of 
experience…Consciousness has its levels, but they are all on the level of experience. It is the experience of the 
subject, the subject’s presence to himself.” “Knowing, Believing, Theology,” CWL 22, 132-133. 
34 Where I differentiate data of consciousness based on the modes subject as object (introspective) and subject as 
subject (performative), Robert Doran differentiates data of consciousness into two sets: psychic at the level of 
sensitive experience (E) and intentional (spiritual) at the level of question and answer (UJD). [See Robert M. 
Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990), 46]. To the extent that we 
genuinely integrate psyche and spirit, the subject as subject does the integrating, whereby we experience ourselves 
as one embodied subject operating at all levels (EUJD). 
35 Scheler, an acknowledged influence on Lonergan, distinguishes the “quality of feeling pain” from the “state of 
pain” [Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. 
Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 256]. In contrast, I would distinguish the experience of pain 
(in the mode of subject as subject) at different levels of conscious intentionality. Pain may vary according to the 
attention it receives at the level of experience; learning to distract attention by focusing on something else is one of 
the best ways to deal with chronic pain. Pain may also vary according to what it means at the level of understanding 
(degree of suffering); at the level of judgment of value (how it affects one’s life); and at the level of decision 
(resolution or accommodation, torment or sacrifice). I plan to treat this subject at greater length in a separate paper. 
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There is another aspect to consider concerning feelings as felt in relation to experiencing and 
deciding. Differentiation of consciousness is not a matter of riding an elevator from lower to 
higher levels of conscious intentionality so much as it is a matter of organic growth and 
development. In “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” Lonergan speaks of “becoming oneself” as a 
subject: as a child learning to reason; as a minor learning to take responsibility; as an adult 
deciding what to make of oneself. In terms of the development of Lonergan’s own thinking on 
the relationship between knowing and doing, I would say that the self-correcting cycle of 
learning, which surfaces in chapter six of Insight, is a rudimentary formulation of cognitive 
operations (fully elaborated in the first eleven chapters) being integrated into the scheme of 
practical reasoning (sketched in chapter 18) – such integration being subject to development and 
decline. While the emphasis is predominantly on cognitive operation, there is tacit 
acknowledgment that cognitive ability develops in an existential context. In the first year of life 
infants master what Piaget calls “object permanence” by which world and image begin to be 
distinguished.36 This development leads to a differentiation of cycles of imaginative rehearsal 
from cycles of performance, which remains in play throughout our lives, although the cycles tend 
to coalesce when we master a task such as learning to speak a language fluently. With further 
cognitive development we learn to play with ideas as well as with objects that we can observe 
and manipulate.  This development involves a differentiation of questions and insights in terms 
of which we formulate and critique our thoughts and actions, concerning not only what has 
happened but also what is yet to happen. 
In chapter 5 of Method Lonergan refers to the child’s “affective symbiosis with the mother” 
[121]. As Piaget notes, this symbiosis is also cognitive. But even at this early stage of 
 
36 Piaget, J. and B. Inhelder. “The Gaps in Empiricism” in Beyond reductionism: new perspectives in the life 
sciences, ed. A. Koestler and J.R. Smythies (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969), 118-160 at 127. 
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development when conscious experience exceeds the objectifying capacity of the infant subject, 
experience and action proceed in a cycle of learning to feed, to cry, to smile, to grasp, to respond 
to touch and voice and facial expression as somehow meaningful37 – not unlike the mature 
subject’s acts of love expressed in response to religious experience that exceeds the objectifying 
capacity of mature conscious intentionality [M 122]. In the third chapter of Method, Lonergan 
speaks of the “internal communication” of “organic and psychic vitality” and “intentional 
consciousness” – of mind, heart, and body – by means of feelings or “affect laden images” [66- 
67]. Feelings as intentional responses arise out of less differentiated feelings in concert with the 
subject’s growth in cognitive capacity, setting the stage for the subject’s actual but precarious 
integration of intentional and existential schemes in a self-correcting cycle that admits of 
heartfelt intelligent, reasonable, and responsible action. 
Feelings in action 
 
Although Lonergan does not explicitly identify a mode of consciousness related to the 
subject-as-subject or say that feelings are data of consciousness in this or any other mode, he 
does claim that transcendental method objectifies both the “subject” and the subject’s “conscious 
operations” [M 20]. In carrying out transcendental method, we objectify the subject’s conscious 
operations – EUJD – in virtue of the “superstructure” of introspection at the second through 
fourth levels. But the “infrastructure” of consciousness as experience, of the subject-as-subject 
qua acting, cannot be fully objectified in intentional consciousness even though such 
consciousness can be heightened.38 In what way, then, do we objectify ourselves as subjects? 
And how does this relate to transcendental method? 
 
 
 
37 Fred Lawrence [personal communication] points out that this is an example of elemental meaning in which there 
is no distinction between meaning and meant. 
38 For the image of “superstructure” and “infrastructure,” see A Third Collection, 57. 
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With these questions in mind it is interesting to note Lonergan’s first use of the word 
“heighten” in Insight: 
[Cosmopolis] is a dimension of consciousness, a heightened grasp of historical origins, a 
discovery of historical responsibilities.  It is not something altogether new, for the 
Marxist has been busy activating the class consciousness of the masses, and before him 
the liberal had succeeded in indoctrinating men with the notion of progress…It is the 
higher synthesis of the liberal thesis and the Marxist antithesis…It stands on a basic 
analysis of the compound-in-tension that is man.39 
This suggests that his interest in the objectification of consciousness goes back to his study of 
Hegel and Marx.  The “compound-in-tension that is man” involves a tension between 
practicality as expedient and culture as the “capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at 
once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart.”40 It is significant in this regard that 
“delight and suffering, laughter and tears, joy and sorrow, aspiration and frustration, 
achievement and failure, wit and humor” – matters of the heart – “stand not within practicality 
but above it.”41 
On this basis we can say that feelings enter into both sides of the dialectic between 
intersubjectivity (the shared smile) and intelligence (the sting of satire) in the individual and in 
society and furthermore that they enter into all levels of the self-correcting cycle of learning as 
involving experience and factual inquiry as well as deliberation and action. The connection or 
bond between experience and action manifests the unity-in-tension of consciousness in terms of 
which we experience ourselves acting and being moved to act as “a sort of continuous and rather 
confused whole.”42 From the standpoint of objectifying consciousness in relation to being 
 
39  Insight, 266. 
40  Insight, 261. 
41 Ibid. 
42 OPCC, 159. 
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oneself, transcendental method seeks to remove some of the confusion and shed light upon the 
unity of this whole. From the standpoint of cosmopolis, transcendental method seeks to build 
upon our growth and development from infancy and childhood to adulthood in terms of our 
growing capacity to think for ourselves and take responsibility for our own actions as members 
of a historically situated human community. 
I have been exploring the significance of being oneself as a mode of consciousness that is 
heightened by transcendental method; of feelings as data that are given in this mode of 
consciousness; and of the conscious tension within being oneself between experience (the 
potency pertaining to the human mind and heart) and action (act, which is the actualization of the 
human heart and mind in society and history). The tension between potency and act is further 
heightened because the relations of potency-to-form and form-to-act also enter human 
consciousness as the tension between inquiry and insight, between reflection and the grasp of the 
virtually unconditioned, and between deliberation and the apprehension and evaluation of values. 
The possibility of both factual and practical insight sets conditions for action not simply as 
motivated but more significantly as deliberate.  According to Lonergan, being oneself is not 
fixed or settled “once for all” but “precarious” in being open to development or breakdown. 
Fred Lawrence notes a parallel between Lonergan’s notion of “being oneself as being” and 
Gadamer’s notion of “experience as being,” which indicates “an encounter with an unfinished 
event and is itself a part of this event.”43 Gadamer develops his notion with an eye to “Hegel’s 
dialectical account of human experience…as a mediation of self-understanding with what is 
other.”44 This dialectic becomes for Lonergan the self-correcting cycle of learning, which is also 
 
 
43 “Fragility of Consciousness,” 69, citing Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald B. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (Continuum: New York 2004), 85. 
44 “Fragility of Consciousness,” 66. 
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open to what is other - both to “other people” and to “what is otherwise.”45 Transcendental 
method is intended to illuminate and perfect this cycle. As Lonergan says, “One must begin 
from performance, if one is to have the experience necessary for understanding what the 
performance is.”46 With this in mind, we can say that heightened consciousness of the subject as 
subject is manifest (objectified) and known in performance or action.47 
There is a reciprocal flow of feelings between experience and decision that factors into 
patterns of experience and interpersonal relations. As Lonergan says in Insight, the unity-in- 
tension of human consciousness is polymorphic in reference to patterns of experience.48 This 
tension plays out in a recurring cycle of experience and decision, in which decision patterns 
experience (not only individually, but socially)49 and experience reveals the limitations of 
present action and the possibilities of future action. This cycle is a conscious scheme of 
limitation and transcendence - a potentially self-correcting scheme of development, learning, and 
self-constitution.50 
Rosemary Haughton provides a good example of this in discussing how a mother might deal 
with a quarrel between her young son and his younger sister (who has used her brother’s paints 
without asking permission). Haughton describes the quarrel as an “eruption of feeling” and the 
mother’s intervention as a potential model for both children to allow feelings into consciousness 
 
45 “Fragility of Consciousness,” 78. 
46 “Christ as Subject,” 174. 
47 “By their fruits you shall know them” [Matthew 7:16]. 
48 Insight, 410. 
49 Regarding decision and patterns of experience, from Method onward Lonergan speaks with increasing frequency 
about development from above in terms of socialization, acculturation, and education [M 79]. As Crowe says, the 
operator of development from above is not just the individual subject, but more importantly subjects acting upon one 
another as subjects in personal relations [Frederick E. Crowe, “An Expansion of Lonergan’s Notion of Value,” 
Lonergan Workshop 7 (1988): 42 n4.]. Along these lines, evolutionary theorists note that the first year of human life 
amounts to an extended period of social gestation unique among mammals in that it takes that long for human 
infants to reach the same stage of biological development that other mammals reach at birth [Niles Eldredge and 
Marjorie Grene, Interactions – The Biological Context of Social Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1992), 181-83]. Even as adults, many if not most of our decisions are determined not by immanently generated 
knowledge, but by socially patterned beliefs. 
50 Insight, 497. 
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in such a way that they deepen and do not destroy fellow feeling. While the mother is 
consciously seeking to resolve the quarrel and to restore peace, she does not think of “peace” as 
such, but feels her way along according to the “quality of human relationships” that are in play.51 
This communication, then, is her giving of love, her personal decision of self- 
surrender…Unless her own formation has taught her to think of herself as primarily at the 
service of her children, spiritually as well as physically, she will not have the kind of 
‘feel’ for the situation that makes possible the lowering of barriers, so that the 
communication of love can take place.52 
The link between experience and action in this communication of love manifests the nexus 
Lonergan identifies in a late essay between “feelings as felt” and “feelings as integrated in 
conscious living.”53 Lonergan notes that it is through symbols – images that evoke or are evoked 
by feeling [M 64] – that mind, heart, and body communicate [M 67].54 This communication 
moves in both directions between conscious operation and organic functioning – from experience 
to decision to action and back again. “Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to 
intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the 
collaboration of organism and psyche”; such communication involves what Lonergan calls 
“elemental meaning” [M 66]. 
This reciprocal relation of experience and action is manifest in the biological pattern of 
experience, whose “complex sequence of delicately coordinated bodily movements is at once the 
 
 
 
51 Rosemary Haughton, The Transformation of Man: A Study of Conversion and Community (Springfield, IL: 
Templegate, 1967), 27. 
52 Transformation of Man, 32. 
53 A Third Collection, 58. 
54 Robert Doran has highlighted the role of feelings as a link between symbols and values in his account of psychic 
conversion. See “Two Ways of Being Conscious: The Notion of Psychic Conversion,” METHOD: Journal of 
Lonergan Studies n.s. 3.1 (2102), 10. 
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consequence of striving and a cause of the continuous shift of sensible presentations.”55 The 
origination of conscious feeling not only at the level of deliberation, but also at the level of 
experience, relates to the apprehension of aesthetic as distinct from moral values (a domain that 
merits separate investigation). Regarding the heightening of consciousness and the 
objectification of the subject as subject in the dramatic pattern of experience, it is good to 
remember the way that feelings enter into interpersonal communication, beginning with 
elemental intersubjectivity and carrying through to the subtleties of gesture, tone, rhythm, and 
facial expression in personal conversation.56 For transcendental method is meant to transform 
the spirit and the art of our daily living. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To put this paper in context, I am a physician working on a philosophy of health from the 
standpoint of generalized empirical method (GEM).57  Why write about transcendental method? 
The first answer concerns the intimate relation between transcendental method and GEM, which 
Andrew Beards has carefully illuminated in a recent essay.58  After designating his approach to 
human and natural science as GEM in Insight, Lonergan shelved the term in favor of 
“transcendental method” up through the publication of Method, only to go back to using GEM 
almost exclusively in his work subsequent to Method.  Beards notes that Lonergan’s motivation 
in going back to using GEM was both practical in communicating his allegiance to the notion of 
verification in data as fundamental to his philosophy and theoretical in calling attention to the 
full range of data within the horizon of any genuine science.  On both these counts my 
 
55  Insight, 206. 
56  Insight, 200. 
57 Patrick Daly, “A Theory of Health and the Healing Arts Based on the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan,” 
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics (2009) 30:147-160. 
58 Andrew Beards, “Generalized Empirical Method,” in Lonergan’s Anthropology Revisited, ed. Gerard Whelan 
(Rome: Gregorian and Biblical Press, 2015), 103-28.
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philosophy of health is in full sympathy with GEM.  And yet, the transcendental thrust remains 
operative in GEM to the extent that experience is open to what is other and what is otherwise. 
My second answer concerns the clinical encounter as the hub of healthcare.  It is an example 
of the self-correcting cycle of learning in action, which in this case revolves around the patient’s 
experience of health and illness.  The clinician attends to the patient’s illness in the mode of 
subject-as-object and seeks to understand the patient’s illness in terms of disease in the mode of 
subject-to-object.  The patient experiences and seeks to understand illness in the mode of 
subject-as-subject as well as subject-as-object; like the clinician, the patient may also seek to 
understand illness in terms of disease in the mode of subject-to-object.  Clinician and patient 
attempt to move from a commonsense to an explanatory perspective and then back again as this 
affects the narrative of the patient’s life.  This interaction involves another mode of conscious 
intentionality, subject-to-subject,59 a domain that also merits further investigation.  In a clinical 
context, ongoing attention to transcendental method promises to deepen our understanding of 
personal relations at the basis of health science and practice.  Which is all to the good since, as 
Francis Peabody said nearly a century ago, “The secret of the care of the patient is in caring for 
the patient.”60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 Bernard Lonergan, “Horizons,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, vol. 17 of Collected Works 
of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 22- 
23. 
60 Francis Peabody, “The Care of the Patient,” Journal of the American Medical Association (1927) 88:877-882. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 The operations of transcendental method: grouped and differentiated² 
 
E (EUJD) 
U[E(EUJD)] 
= 
 
= 
*EE 
U(EE) 
+ 
 
+ 
EU 
*U(EU) 
+ 
 
+ 
EJ 
U(EJ) 
+ 
 
+ 
ED 
U(ED) 
J(U[E (EUJD)]) = J[U(EE)] + J[U(EU)] + *J[U(EJ)] + J[U(ED)] 
D[J(U[E (EUJD)])] = D(J[U(EE)]) + D(J[U(EU)]) + D(J[U(EJ)]) + *D(J[U(ED)]) 
² Compare Lonergan on differentiated consciousness: “Considering only the mathematically possible combinations, 
one can list some thirty-one different types of differentiated consciousness“ [M 272]. 
* In Table 2, I select these operations to demonstrate a symbolism that differentiates their introspective and 
performative modes. 
 
 
Table 2 Modes of direct and transcendental operation 
 
Level Operations Mode of conscious intentionality 
 Basic Direct (SóO) 
1 E S<E>O 
2 U S<U>O 
3 J S<J>O 
4 D S<D>O 
 Transcendental Heightened 
 (selected) Introspective (objectified) Performative (integrated) 
∑Só[(Se)2óO] (Sl)L+1óO 
1 EE (Se)2<E>O 
2 UEU S<U>[(Se)2<U>O)] (Sue)3<U>O 
3 JUEJ S<J>(S <U>[(Se)2<J>O]) (Sjue)4<J>O 
4 DJUED S<D>[S<J>(S<U>[(Se)2<D>O])] (Sdjue)5<D>O 
KEY: 
1) SóO represents the subject-object dipole of any intentional act. 
2) E(EUJD) is a performative, not an introspective mode of operation. Higher levels of transcendental 
method can be heightened performatively as well as introspectively. 
3) Transcendental method in the introspective mode of consciousness unfolds as a sequence or 
series of operations that builds on the performance of E (EUJD), or in differentiated symbolism, 
[(Se)2óO]. 
4) Transcendental method in the performative mode of consciousness raises the power of the subject 
operating at any given level: (Sl)L+1óO, where lower case l indicates the range of operations sublated 
at any given level; L+1 indicates one higher than the ordinal value of the highest transcendental 
operation under consideration; and the ordinal value of E=1, U=2, J=3, and D=4. This power is one 
order higher than the level (L) of transcendental method on which the subject operates, but it is not a 
new level of operation. 
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Table 3 Comparing original and modified notation of transcendental method 
 
 Original Modified 
Basic pattern EUJD S<E>O; S<U>O; S<J>O; S<D>O 
Consciously 
heighten perfect perform 
       grouped E(EUJD) (Se)2<EUJD>O 
       differentiated EE + EU + EJ + ED (Se)2<E>O + (Se)2<U>O + (Se)2<J>O + (Se)2<D>O 
Intentionally 
heighten 
explicitly introspective, 
implicitly performative explicitly introspective 
explicitly performative, 
existentially heightened 
 U[E (EUJD)] S<U>[(Se)2< EUJD>O] (Sue)3< EUJD>O 
 JU[E (EUJD)] S<J>(S <U>[(Se)2< EUJD>O]) (Sjue)4< EUJD>O 
 DJU[E (EUJD)] S<D>[S<J>(S<U>[(Se)2< EUJD>O])] (Sdjue)5<EUJD>O 
       objectified in intentional consciousness in action 
 
